Hegel's India presents all of Hegels writings on and about India. It is remarkable how much effort Hegel expended on what he ultimately characterized merely as fantastic, subjective, wild, dreamy, frenzied, absurd, and repetitive. If Indian art, religion, and philosophy, are so grossly inadequate, what explains his life-long fascination in this unparalleled way? This reinterpretation of Hegel argues that Indian thought haunted Hegel, representing a sort of nemesis to his own philosophy.

This article places Friedrich Nietzsche’s call to trans-valuate values into a wider historical panorama, hearkening back to ethical orientations within both the Archaic and the Attic Greek world with respect to the unity of the virtues. It is argued that the unity of cognitive and bodily excellence, so central to the Greek world, and culminating in Aristotle’s ethics, functioned inchoately as the measure according to which Nietzsche evaluated values. Extrapolating from the phenomenon of rival perceptions regarding the paradigmatic sculpture of (...) Rodin’s The Thinker—both from the time of its creation and in our own day—the article concludes by suggesting that moral philosophies alienated from the demand of the unity of physical and cognitive virtues might indeed be subject to the devastating critique that Nietzsche had advanced. The egalitarian nature of these values and this critique, however, remains an open question. (shrink)

This book brings together two of the most powerful and relevant philosophical critiques of human rights: the post-colonialist and the post-Althusserian, its balanced internal structure not just throwing these two critiques together, but actually forcing them to enter into confrontation and dialogue. The book is organised in three parts: at each end, the post-colonialist and the post-Althusserian critiques are represented by some of their main thinkers, while in the middle, an American intermezzo functions as a genuine Derridian supplement: always already (...) contaminating the purity of the two theoretical schools, preventing their enclosure and, hence, fuelling and complicating further their mutual confrontation. As in any authentic dialogue, the introduction and the conclusion each claim victory for one of the sides by changing the very terms and rules of the dialogue, picturing it as a confrontation between emancipatory universalism and inefficient particularism, or as a split between hypocrisy and truth. (shrink)

The global justice debate has been raging for forty years. Not merely the terms and conditions, but, more deeply, the epistemic, existential and ethical grounds of the international relations of persons, states and institutions are being determined, debated and negotiated. Yet the debate remains essentially a parochial one, confined largely to Western intellectuals and institutional spaces. An Introduction to the field is therefore still urgently required, because it remains necessary to include more ‘global’ voices into this debate of worldwide reach (...) and significance. The book addresses this need in two closely related ways. In Part I, it introduces the main contours of the debate by reproducing three of the most fundamental and influential essays that have been composed on the topic — essays by Peter Singer, Thomas Pogge and Thomas Nagel. In Part II, it makes a decisive critical intervention in the main stream of the debate through exposing the participation deficit afflicting the theorization of global justice. This part begins with a well-known essay by Amartya Sen, who famously referred to the ‘parochialism’ of the global justice debate in making a break with the Rawlsian paradigm that has dominated the field until now. Finally, a series of lively essays newly composed for this volume reflect on the possibilities for deparochializing global justice opened up by Sen’s work in this area. The book will be useful for students of international relations, postcolonial studies, political theory, and social and political philosophy, as well as for those engaged in studies of globalization or global studies. (shrink)

This article critiques the ‘withdrawal approach’ to deparochializing global justice and argues for an approach that views ‘departure’ from mainstream theorization as integral to truly critical engagement. It introduces Aakash Singh Rathore’s approach to deparochialization – purportedly founded on Amartya Sen’s The Idea of Justice – as an example of ‘withdrawal approach’ which advocates repudiation of the West-centric and ‘profession-oriented’ academic debate on global justice, and promotion of context-sensitive theories. I argue that Rathore’s ‘withdrawal approach’ springs from (...) an inaccurate reading of Sen’s The Idea of Justice and hence overlooks the critical spirit of Sen’s engagement with the global heritage of ideas and 'critical departure’ from parochial theories. This article further explores three analytical forms of parochialism that dominant theories of global justice may suffer from: epistemic, conceptual and descriptive. Using the case of India’s superrich and their culpability in global poverty, I demonstrate the parochial construction of ‘duties’ in Thomas Pogge’s theory of global poverty. I argue that deparochializing global justice, involving critical engagement with existing theorization along conceptual and descriptive lines, can illuminate a new way forward in global justice research. (shrink)

Objective: Traditional research often categorizes emotion regulation strategies as adaptive or maladaptive, overlooking crucial situational and individual differences that dictate their efficacy. The literature highlights the need for a more nuanced approach, like the role of emotion regulation flexibility. Despite its importance, research on developing and testing interventions that promote this flexibility is scarce. Addressing this gap, our study designed and tested an “Emotion Regulation Flexibility Booster Program” (ERFBP). We aimed to assess its efficacy in improving emotion regulation flexibility (ERF) (...) and its impact on various mental health indicators. Method: We recruited 153 participants with low emotion regulation flexibility, randomly assigning them to experimental, control, and no-treatment groups. The experimental group was provided with an intervention based on an ERF model. The control group received sessions on study habits, whereas no-treatment group received no training. Results: The analysis indicated that participants in the ERFBP group exhibited significant changes in ERF, subjective wellbeing, and emotion regulation goals and psychological distress compared to baseline measurements and post-intervention scores of other two groups. Conclusion: These findings support the effectiveness of the ERFBP in enhancing ERF and wellbeing. However, further research must confirm these findings across diverse contexts and populations. (shrink)

Flap EndoNuclease‐1 (FEN‐1) is a multifunctional and structure‐specific nuclease involved in nucleic acid processing pathways. It plays a critical role in maintaining human genome stability through RNA primer removal, long‐patch base excision repair and resolution of dinucleotide and trinucleotide repeat secondary structures. In addition to its flap endonuclease (FEN) and nick exonuclease (EXO) activities, a new gap endonuclease (GEN) activity has been characterized. This activity may be important in apoptotic DNA fragmentation and in resolving stalled DNA replication forks. The multiple (...) functions of FEN‐1 are regulated via several means, including formation of complexes with different protein partners, nuclear localization in response to cell cycle or DNA damage and post‐translational modifications. Its functional deficiency is predicted to cause genetic diseases, including Huntington's disease, myotonic dystrophy and cancers. This review summarizes the knowledge gained through efforts in the past decade to define its structural elements for specific activities and possible pathological consequences of altered functions of this multirole player. BioEssays 27:717–729, 2005. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

This article presents the results of an exploratory study that investigated the role that religiosity plays in determining consumer attitudes/beliefs in various situations regarding questionable consumer practices. Two dimensions of religiosity – intrinsic and extrinsic religiousness – were studied. Results indicated that an intrinsic religiousness was a significant determinant of consumer ethical beliefs, but extrinsic religiousness was not related to those beliefs.

Academic research studies examining the ethical attitudes and behaviors of salespeople have produced several frameworks that explore the ethical decision-making processes to which salespeople adhere when faced with ethical dilemmas. Past literature enriches our understanding; however, a critical review of the relevant literature suggests that an emotional route to salesperson ethical decision-making has yet to be explored. Given the fact that individuals’ emotional capacities play an important role in decision-making when faced with an ethical dilemma, there is a need for (...) empirical research in this area. We address this issue by outlining and testing an emotion-based model to study the ethical attitudes and behaviors of salespeople in a relational selling context. Building on the cognitive-affective model proposed by Gaudine and Thorne (J Bus Ethics 31:175–187, 2001 ), we outline a framework that incorporates higher order prosocial emotions: capacity for concern and capacity for guilt. We include salesperson’s role clarity within the organization as a moderator to examine person–situation interaction. (shrink)

Ethical review systems need to build on their experiences of COVID-19 research to enhance their preparedness for future pandemics. Recommendations from representatives from over twenty countries include: improving relationships across the research ecosystem; demonstrating willingness to reform and adapt systems and processes; and making the case robustly for better resourcing.

Patients have received experimental pharmaceuticals outside of clinical trials for decades. There are no industry-wide best practices, and many companies that have granted compassionate use, or ‘preapproval’, access to their investigational products have done so without fanfare and without divulging the process or grounds on which decisions were made. The number of compassionate use requests has increased over time. Driving the demand are new treatments for serious unmet medical needs; patient advocacy groups pressing for access to emerging treatments; internet platforms (...) enabling broad awareness of compelling cases or novel drugs and a lack of trust among some that the pharmaceutical industry and/or the FDA have patients’ best interests in mind. High-profile cases in the media have highlighted the gap between patient expectations for compassionate use and company utilisation of fair processes to adjudicate requests. With many pharmaceutical manufacturers, patient groups, healthcare providers and policy analysts unhappy with the inequities of the status quo, fairer and more ethical management of compassionate use requests was needed. This paper reports on a novel collaboration between a pharmaceutical company and an academic medical ethics department that led to the formation of the Compassionate Use Advisory Committee. Comprising medical experts, bioethicists and patient representatives, CompAC established an ethical framework for the allocation of a scarce investigational oncology agent to single patients requesting non-trial access. This is the first account of how the committee was formed and how it built an ethical framework and put it into practice. (shrink)

In the past decades, the world has witnessed significant growth in environmental issues such as the generation of waste, climatic changes, and depletion of natural resources. Due to this, there has been a substantial upsurge in consumers who prefer green products. Hence, exploring the stable set of characteristics of green consumers becomes extremely important for organizations to develop customer‐oriented targeting and segmenting strategies. The present study attempts to explore key factors influencing green purchase behavior and the behavioral profile of green (...) consumers in the Indian context. The study surveyed 400 respondents from Punjab. Multivariate analysis was performed to analyze the data. The results of the analysis revealed three distinctive consumer clusters based on green purchase behavior. “Pro‐environmentals” represent the segment of green consumers. Consumers of this cluster were found to be highly environmentally conscious. Besides this, the study confirmed noticeable differences in the three clusters in terms of gender, age, number of children, and marital status. Finally, the results indicated the behavioral profile of green and non‐green consumers and explained prominent differences between the three clusters. This knowledge shall enable marketers to design tailor‐made marketing strategies focusing on the specific needs of each consumer cluster. (shrink)

The use of Ritalin and other stimulant drug treatments for attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) raises distinctive moral dilemmas for parents; these moral dilemmas have not been adequately addressed in the bioethics literature. This paper draws upon data from a qualitative empirical study to investigate parents' use of the moral ideal of authenticity as part of their narrative justifications for dosing decisions and actions. I show that therapeutic decisions and actions are embedded in valued cultural ideals about masculinity, self-actualization and success, (...) as well as in moral conceptions of authenticity and personal freedom. I argue that this investigation of parents' moral justifications and dosing dilemmas raises questions about the validity of authenticity as a transcendent moral principle. Moreover, this study demonstrates that in order to be relevant, bioethical analysis of neurocognitive enhancement must engage with ground-up studies of moral principles and decision-making in context. (shrink)

Classical treatise on the fundamentals of Nyaya philosophy with commentaries; critical edition.

This article provides empirical evidence of the social context and moral reasoning embedded within a parents’ decision to participate in autism genetics research. Based on in-depth interviews of parents who donated their family’s blood and medical information to an autism genetic database, three narratives of participation are analyzed, including the altruistic parent, the obligated parent, and the diagnostic parent. Although parents in this study were not generally concerned with bioethical principles such as autonomy and the issues of informed consent and/or (...) privacy and confidentiality of genetic information, a critical analysis reveals contextual bioethics embedded within these different narratives. These include the negotiations of responsibility that parents confront in biomedical research, the misguided hope and expectations parents place in genomic science, and the structural barriers of obtaining an autism diagnosis and educational services. Based on these findings, this article demonstrates the limits of a principle-based approach to bioethics and the emergent forms of biological citizenship that takes into account the social situations of people’s lives and the moral reasoning they negotiate when participating in autism genetic research. (shrink)

Comprises articles on Sikh faith and philosophy.

In business ethics, there is a large body of literature focusing on the conditions, factors, and influences in the ethical decision-making processes. This work builds upon the past critical reviews by updating and extending the literature review found in Craft’s :221–259, 2013) study, extending her literature review to include a total of 141 articles. Since past reviews have focused on categorizing results based upon various independent variables, we instead synthesize and look at the trends of these based upon the four (...) ethical decision making categories: Awareness, Behavior, Judgment, and Intention. We focus on the moderation and mediation effects found within these studies and provide an in-depth analysis of future trends. Furthermore, we also highlight key statistical and methodological concerns, outline overarching trends, and directions of future research in empirical ethical decision making. (shrink)

Intentions are an important concept in Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science. We present a formal theory of intentions and beliefs based on Discourse Representation Theory that captures many of their important logical properties. Unlike possible worlds approaches, this theory does not assume that agents are perfect reasoners, and gives a realistic view of their internal architecture; unlike most representational approaches, it has an objective semantics, and does not rely on an ad hoc labeling of the internal states of agents. We (...) describe a minimal logic for intentions and beliefs that is sound and complete relative to our semantics. We discuss several additional axioms, and the constraints on the models that validate them. (shrink)

In this commentary, I raise a few questions about Schmidt’s argument against (R-E): whether facts about incoherence are directly reasons for suspension on particular propositions, as opposed to reasons against sets of attitudes; whether (R-E) should really be formulated in terms of a broad category of “doxastic attitudes” that includes transitional attitudes like suspension; and whether incoherence-based reasons really must fit into the category of “epistemic reasons,” as opposed to be a more general category of right-kind reasons. Though my questions (...) reflect some skepticism about the specifics of Schmidt’s argument, I conclude that it succeeds in what I take to be its broader aim. (shrink)

We present evidence that preschool children oftentimes understand disjunctive sentences as if they were conjunctive. The result holds for matrix disjunctions as well as disjunctions embedded under every. At the same time, there is evidence in the literature that children understand or as inclusive disjunction in downward-entailing contexts. We propose to explain this seemingly conflicting pattern of results by assuming that the child knows the inclusive disjunction semantics of or, and that the conjunctive inference is a scalar implicature. We make (...) two assumptions about implicature computation in the child: that children access only a proper subset of the adult alternatives, and that children possess the adult capacity to strengthen sentences with implicatures. As a consequence, children are expected to sometimes not compute any implicatures at all, but in other cases they are expected to compute an implicature that is different from the adult implicature. We argue that the child’s conjunctive strengthening of disjunctive sentences realizes the latter possibility: the adult infers that the conjunction is false but the child infers that the conjunction is true. This behaviour is predicted when our assumptions about child development are coupled with the assumption that a covert exhaustive operator is responsible for strengthening in both the child and the adult. Specifically, children’s conjunctive strengthening is predicted to follow from the same mechanism used by adults to compute conjunctive free choice implicatures in response to disjunctive permission sentences. We furthermore argue that this parallel between the child and the adult extends to disambiguation preferences. In particular, we present evidence that children prefer to strengthen disjunctions to conjunctions, in matrix and embedded positions ; this result mirrors previous findings that adults prefer to compute free choice, at the root and under every. We propose a disambiguation strategy that explains the preference for conjunctive strengthening – by both the child and the adult – even though there is no general preference for exhaustification. Specifically, we propose that the preference for a conjunctive strengthening follows from a pragmatic preference for a complete answer to the Question Under Discussion. (shrink)

The uniqueness of Psychiatry as a medical speciality lies in the fact that aside from tackling what it considers as illnesses, it has perchance to comment on and tackle many issues of social relevance as well. Whether this is advisable or not is another matter; but such a process is inevitable due to the inherent nature of the branch and the problems it deals with. Moreover this is at the root of the polarization of psychiatry into opposing psychosocial and biological (...) schools. This gets reflected in their visualization of scope, in definitions and in methodology as well. Whilst healthy criticism of one against the other school is necessary, there should be caution against hasty application of one's frame of reference to an approach that does not intend to follow, or conform to, one's methodology. This should be done within the referential framework of the school critically evaluated, with due consideration for its methods and concepts. Similarly, as at present, there is no evidence to prove one or the other of these approaches as better, aside from personal choice. We can say so even if there is a strong paradigm shift towards the biological at present. A renaissance of scientific psychoanalysis coupled with a perceptive neurobiology which can translate those insights into testable hypotheses holds the greatest promise for psychiatry in the future. This suggests the need for unification of diverse appearing approaches to get a more comprehensive and enlightened worldview. It requires a highly integrative capacity. Just as a physicist thinks simultaneously in terms of particles and waves, a psychiatrist must think of motives, emotions and desires in the same breath as neurobiology, genetics and psychopharmacology. However, the integration must be attempted without destroying the internal cohesiveness of the individual schools. This will give a fair chance for polarization in which a single proper approach in psychiatry could emerge, which may be a conglomerate of diverse appearing approaches of today, or one which supersedes the rest. A synthesis of cognitive psychology and neuroscience offers the greatest promise at present. (shrink)

I defend a relational account of difference in the moral status between fetuses and newborns. The difference in moral status between a fetus and a newborn is that the newborn baby is the proper object of ‘parental responsibility’ whereas the fetus is not. ‘Parental responsibilities’ are a moral dimension of a ‘parent-child relation’, a relation which newborn babies stand in, but fetuses do not. I defend this relational account by analyzing the concepts of ‘parent’ and ‘child’, and conclude that the (...) difference in the moral status between fetuses and newborns means one may claim abortion is morally permissible while also claiming infanticide is not morally permissible, without inconsistency between the two claims. (shrink)

Conversations with The Universe: How the World Speaks to Us reveals how repetitions, coincidence and synchronicity are part of a personal conversation from the Universe, intended to provide ease and guidance. We are not alone, nor have we been creating life experiences on our own. There is a co-creative Universal Intelligence who is very much involved and continually seeking a dialogue. The problem is not so much the life challenges, but our own individual lack of communication with our co-creator.

This book portrays the Supreme Reality in five facets, discusses the issues of Divine Ordinance and Grace, humanism and peace, suffering and death from Sikh perspective.

Susanna Rinard has recently offered a new argument for pragmatism and against evidentialism. According to Rinard, evidentialists must hold that the rationality of belief is determined in a way that is different from how the rationality of other states is determined. She argues that we should instead endorse a view she calls Equal Treatment, according to which the rationality of all states is determined in the same way. In this paper, I show that Rinard’s claims are mistaken, and that evidentialism (...) is more theoretically virtuous than its opponents sometimes give it credit for. Not only does evidentialism not make an exception for belief, but it fits naturally into a unified, explanatorily powerful account of the rationality of intentional mental states. According to such an account, the rationality of all intentional mental states, including belief, is determined by the right kind of reasons for those states. Since the right kind of reasons for belief just are evidential considerations, this unified account entails evidentialism. I conclude, contra Rinard, that evidentialism can be situated within a general account of rationality that is at least as theoretically virtuous as pragmatism, if not more so. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend an account of the reasons for which we act, believe, and so on for any Ф such that there can be reasons for which we Ф. Such reasons are standardly called motivating reasons. I argue that three dominant views of motivating reasons (psychologism, factualism and disjunctivism) all fail to capture the ordinary concept of a motivating reason. I show this by drawing out three constraints on what motivating reasons must be, and demonstrating how each view (...) fails to satisfy at least one of these constraints. I then propose and defend my own account of motivating reasons, which I call the Guise of Normative Reasons Account. On the account I defend, motivating reasons are propositions. A proposition is the reason for which someone Ф‐s when (a) she represents that proposition as a normative reason to Ф, and (b) her representation explains, in the right way, her Ф‐ing. As I argue, the Guise of Normative Reasons Account satisfies all three constraints on what motivating reasons must be, and weathers several objections that might be leveled against propositionalist views. (shrink)

It is now standard to distinguish between two kinds of rationality: substantive rationality, which consists in holding attitudes that are substantively reasonable or justified, and structural rationality, which consists in holding attitudes that fit together in the right ways. What, if anything, unifies these two kinds of rationality? In this paper, I propose that norms of rationality arise because we are epistemically limited beings who cannot directly ensure the correctness of our attitudes. Substantive and structural rationality represent two different ways (...) of manifesting a fundamental commitment to getting things correct, given our epistemic limitations. Correspondingly, substantive and structural irrationality are distinct rational failures. Substantively irrational attitudes involve a failure to live up to the commitments that constitute those attitudes. Structurally irrational combinations of attitudes are constituted by inconsistent commitments, which guarantees that we will fail to live up to at least some of our commitments in holding these attitudes. (shrink)